

Working session

Date 18th Feb. - 89.

- Heads of State + Govt. → limited time available + clear picture
of what to do; first order business principle
- other audience → will find mistakes, overlook

In Part II → separate regional policy from
other common policies

Part I

as an phenomenon of integration

why W.R. failed

3 points: 1) EEC - created as a stepwise Europe, in
consequence; gave momentum & strengthened

2) ECU development; technical, without much help;

obstacles, mainly by members,
but, other obstacles

3). movement reached unique

on without rules, the Single Act raises the question of how much
consolidation is needed;

in any case by far a closer coordination or
agreement;

- in the last off.,
- developing relations of EUs; but not sufficiently
between institutions;

New EU's selected values

Cochrane - report → without coordination

more coordination; quote in report!

changes that systems must submit; functions; decisions to take;

Euro → 3 elements for approximation

- reduction of complexity of coordination
- greater coordination
- structural + regional steering policies
 - fiscal rules
 - monetary policy
 - calculating shared macro-ec. policy coordinate
 - changes in the implementation of decisions between
of policy steering the C

functioning of the system

overall → welfare, function, stronger capacity to react → private firms to
cooperate

→ in public sector

trade off between a
greater choice against
constraints

- more homogenous
- Single Dist
- it is so greater allocation efficiency
- programme
product*
- greater demands for coordination
- greater room for maneuver at the C-level to promote growth

Costs: - no choice \Rightarrow of different institutional models
(but which are contained in the EEC)

- technological by def.
(not any more than much interest in that)
- tends to automation & high force
leading to the centre
technical
as outcome/measures & importance

Comprehension

- limitation of national chart for models of practice, social security, education
- trade off of advantages for consumers are disadvantages for producers...

Policymakers \rightarrow from many ways
from coordination (or especially to ...)

- symmetry effects

↳ it's difficult to agree by the same amount.

- interest rate convergence
= reduction of transaction costs

- MLI policies
= transparency of prices; correct relative prices

- DM - inflation
rate

- coordination of macro-ec. policy → gives chance to
standard by ECU,
could be done too

↳ stronger in ECU
because of

com rbg: if

ECU is used
by coordination, there
will be problems

+ comparability for policy

measured ought be pub. coordination

and then + with that the single market collapses

↳ problem → is the coordination more bank without

* with ECU can avoid the friction
or less friction

afternoon

for Part II \rightarrow impossible. But, it will need time;

Part III

or L-P \rightarrow is it necessary to go into detail?

Should we not go to single currency quickly?

Part III \rightarrow L-P point.

do we need stage II

initial
decisions
interim

II

decisions

interim

↓

final currency

ask CP

1) - if. same Treaty \rightarrow of yes \rightarrow same as I + II

2) \rightarrow sole Treaty \rightarrow look at the present draft

3) Treaty at end, which members of I + II

Constitutional Law of the State of Ontario

Marked with his Consideration and Rejection