Global vs. Local Banking: **A Double Adverse Selection Problem**

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What I do

- Study how globalization of banking systems has affected credit allocation and the macroeconomy.
- Show—both theoretically and empirically—that it creates a double adverse selection problem in credit allocation, which generates spillover and amplification of funding shocks across countries.

Research questions:

Why do some firms borrow from global banks instead of the traditional local banks?

What role do global banks play in propagating shocks?

Traditional Theory

Firm-Bank Sorting, by Firm Size and Age Quartile

Motivation

Total Global Banking Credit, All countries



Model



New Theory

Data:

•Global banks specialize information on global risk. Local banks specialize information on local risk.

Empirics

Ingredients

Firms: returns dependent on global and local risk.

Syndicated loans from Dealscan across 24 countries.

•Firm balance sheet data from Amadeus, Orbis, Compustat Global.



- Banks: double information asymmetry.
- Global banks (G) \rightarrow information on z_i^G .
- •Local banks (L) \rightarrow information on z_i^L .

•Offer break-even interest rates that reflect firm and adverse selection.

Prediction 1: Equilibrium firm-bank sorting and double adverse selection



Test 1: Global banks lend more to firms with higher z_i^G/z_i^L , and vice versa for local banks



Test 2: Shock to bank funding cost affect credit allocation at the extensive and intensive margin.

Laboratory: Eurozone firms

Funding shock: monetary policy shocks

Data: tick-by-tick futures data (Source: CQG Data Factory)



Example: expansionary monetary policy in home country of global banks



- Eurozone monetary policy shock: 3-month Euribor futures
- US monetary policy shock: 30-day Federal Funds futures

3	3	3
$\Delta Y_{it} = \sum \beta^q (\Delta U S R_t)$	$\ge T^q_{it-1}) + \sum \delta^q (\Delta E U R$	$t \ge T_{it-1}^q) + \sum \gamma^q T_{it-1}^q + \nu_i + \sigma_t + \epsilon_i$
q = 1	$q{=}1$	q=2

	(1)	(2)	_
	Extensive	Intensive	
$\Delta MP^{US} * T^1$	-0.049	-89.354*	-
	(0.119)	(48.542)	
$\Delta MP^{US} * T^2$	-0.241**	62.796	
	(0.120)	(52.769)	
$\Delta MP^{US} * T^3$	-0.117	98.427**	
	(0.118)	(46.293)	
$\Delta MP^{EU} * T^1$	0.057	136.864**	-
	(0.118)	(56.249)	
$\Delta MP^{EU} * T^2$	0.264**	76.563	
	(0.118)	(52.087)	
$\Delta MP^{EU} * T^3$	0.173	-101.876*	
	(0.116)	(54.681)	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	-
Time FE	Yes	Yes	
Observations	11,454	3,367	
R-squared	0.067	0.052	
	1		-

-0.05

-0.1

-0.15

A 25-basis-point shock to Euro area monetary policy

I the probability of firm in the second tercile of z_i^G/z_i^L distribution switching into a US bank by 8.5 percentage points.

↓ the interest rate spread for the inframarginal firms that continue to borrow from US banks by 25 basis points.

Spillover effects

- I the interest rate spread for the inframarginal firms that continue to borrow from Euro area banks by 34 basis points.
 - Amplification effects