



Demographic changes, migration and economic growth in the euro area

Axel Börsch-Supan


- *Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA)
at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy (MPISOC),*
- *Technical University of Munich (TUM)*
- *National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in Cambridge, Mass., USA*

ECB Forum on Central Banking 2019, Sintra, Portugal, 17-19 Juni 2019




Demographic Variation: Old-Age Dependency Ratio

$\#(65+)/\#(20-64)$



Demographic variation

**1. Sharp transition
from babyboom
to babybust**




**2. Long-term low
birth rate and high
life expectancy**

**3. Still rather high
birth rate**


How reliable?

#(65+)/#(20-64)



Would migration help?


#(65+)/#(20-64)





Would a new baby boom help?

#(65+)/#(20-64)




Macroeconomic challenge

share(20-64)

$$Y = F(K, L)$$

$$Y/N = f(K/N, L/N)$$




Adaption 1: Capital intensity

OLG Model (2015=100%, net of productivity trend)




representing the
euro zone



Börsch-Supan, Härtl
& Ludwig, AER, 2014




Relative price of capital & labor



Adaption 1: Capital intensity

OLG Model (2015=100%, net of productivity trend)




representing the euro zone

Börsch-Supan, Härtl & Ludwig, AER, 2014

Adaption 2: Foreign investment

OLG Model (2015=100%, net of productivity trend)



representing the
euro zone

VS.


representing
ROW

Börsch-Supan, Härtl
& Ludwig, AER, 2014

Adaption 2: Foreign investment


International capital flows [%GDP]

from  
to 



Automatic vs. policy driven


OLG Model (2015=100%, net of productivity trend)




Reform to
increase LFP:

1. RetireAge + 2
2. EntryAge - 2
3. FemLFP = 90%
of maleLFP
4. Unemp=NAIRU

Exogenous labor supply





Endogenous labor supply



Interim résumé

1. Ageing takes about 1/3 of growth in euro zone – still positive!
2. Higher capital intensity lets GDP/cap decline less than labor/cap
3. Foreign investment increases GNI/cap and thus cons/cap
4. Happens automatically (well....)
5. Moderate structural reform needs to (and can!) fill the remaining gap
6. Unless backlash effects are strong



Asset Meltdown




Mankiw-Weil (1989) housing market: 47%



Microfoundations: productivity



Microfoundations: health





Self-assessed health:
Percent excellent,
very good, good

Functional health:
Percent without any limitation



Physical health:
Grip strength [kg]
with 95% confidence interval



Ageing and de/inflation



Ageing and de/inflation



Final résumé

1. While all countries age, timing, speed and extent are very different across countries
2. Negative impact on growth is partially dampened by endogenous reactions (higher capital intensity, more foreign investment)
3. Moderate structural reforms need to (and can!) fill the remaining gap
4. Declining health and productivity do NOT prevent such reforms for the average worker
5. Ageing-induced deflation effects strongly depend on demographic characteristics of a country

Microfoundations: saving

