Optimal Trend Inflation

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- Productivity at firm level displays *systematic* trends:
 - life cycle: firms start small/unproductive, become productive, exit
 - product life cycle: new products, higher quality, initially higher price
- Productivity trends at the firm level
 - \implies strongly affect optimal inflation dynamics
 - & rationalizes positive steady state inflation

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- Productivity of price adjusting firms equal to productivity of non-adjusting firms
- Adjusting firms' price = price of non-adjusting firms

 \implies strong force towards zero inflation

Woodford(2003), Kahn, King & Wolman(2003), Schmitt-Grohé & Uribe(2010)

- Golosov&Lucas (2007), Nakamura&Steinsson (2010)
 idiosyncratic firm level productivity ⇔ without systematic trend
- Do not look at optimal inflation
- Results sugests zero inflation optimal: av. prod. of adjusting firm ≈ av. prod. of non-adjusting firm

Enrich basic homogeneous firm setup by adding:

- Firm entry & exit
- Measure δ of randomly selected firms: very negative productivity shock & exit
- Exiting firms replaced by same measure of newly entering firms
- Alternative interpretations of setup possible (product substitution, quality improvements)

Firm-level productivity trends driven by 3 underlying trends:

- aggregate trend: productivity gains experienced by all firms
- experience trend: firms become more productive over time
- cohort trend: productivity level for new cohort of firms

• Production function of firm $j \in [0, 1]$:

$$Y_{jt} = A_t Q_{t-s_{jt}} G_{jt} \left(K_{jt}^{1-rac{1}{\phi}} L_{jt}^{rac{1}{\phi}} - F_t
ight)$$
 ,

where s_{jt} is time since last δ -shock

$$\begin{aligned} A_t &= a_t A_{t-1}, \\ Q_t &= q_t Q_{t-1}, \\ G_{jt} &= \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s_{jt} = 0, \\ g_t G_{jt-1} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

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 (a_t, q_t, g_t) arbitrary stationary process w mean **a**, **q**, **g**

- Three productivity trends: **a**, **q** and **g**
- Measure δ of firms: productivity drops to zero & exit
- Special cases w/o firm level trends: $\delta = 0$ or if $\mathbf{q}_t \equiv \mathbf{g}_t$

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Figure: Productivity dynamics in a setting with firm entry and exit

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- Strength of effect independent of turnover rate δ > 0
 Discontinous jump of optimal inflation: δ = 0 → δ > 0

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- Optimal gross steady state inflation rate

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 - has to know firm level trends & shocks to these trends

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- Optimal inflation
 - cannot be inferred from aggregate productivity trends
 - has to know firm level trends & shocks to these trends
- Optimal inflation $\Pi^* = 1$ if $\delta = 0$.

• What is the optimal inflation rate of the US economy?

Image: Image:

3

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- Extend model to multi-sector economy: sector-specific price stickiness
 & sector-specific trends in TFP (a_{zt}), experience (q_{zt}) and cohort (g_{zt})

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- Model-consistent approach for estimating SS inflation rate from firm level trends: 147million firm observations from the LBD database (US Census)
- Estimated optimal infl. rate steadily declined:

1986: \approx 2% \implies 2013: \approx 1%

- Few papers: inflation \Leftrightarrow productivity dynamics
- All of them find negative inflation rates optimal:
 - Wolman (JMCB, 2011): two sector economy with different sectorial productivity trends, homogeneous firms in each sector, neg. inflation optimal despite monetary frictions being absent
 - Amano, Murchison & Rennison (JME, 2009): homogeneous firm model with sticky prices and wages & aggregate growth; wages more sticky than prices; to depress wage-markups deflation turns out optimal.

Related Literature

- Zero inflation approx. optimal in models w homogeneous firms Woodford (2003), Kahn, King & Wolman (2003), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2010)
- Zero lower bound cannot justify positive average rates of inflation: Adam & Billi (2006), Coibion, Gorodnichenko & Wieland (2012)
- Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016): idiosyncratic risk -> positive inflation increasingly optimal
- Downward nominal wage rigidity may justify positive inflation rates Kim & Ruge-Murcia (2009), Benigno & Ricci (2011), Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2013), Carlsson & Westermark (2016)
- Positive inflation possibly optimal in models with endogenous entry: Corsetti & Bergin (2008), Bilbiie, Ghironi & Melitz (2008), Bilbiie, Fujiwara & Ghironi (2014)

() Sticky price model with δ -shocks

- Ø Aggregation & optimality of flex price equilibrium
- Optimal inflation: main result
- Multi-sector extension & empirical strategy

- Consider a Calvo sticky price setup: price stickiness parameter α (main results extend to menu cost setting)
- Continuum of sticky price firms, Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate Y_t
- Random sample δ receives δ -shocks
- Firm productivity dynamics as described before
- Competitive labor and capital markets

Sticky Price Model

Household problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max E_{0} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \xi_{t} \left(\frac{[C_{t} V(L_{t})]^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \right) \\ s.t. \\ C_{t} + K_{t+1} + \frac{B_{t}}{P_{t}} = \\ (r_{t} + 1 - d) K_{t} + \frac{W_{t}}{P_{t}} L_{t} + \int_{0}^{1} \frac{\Theta_{jt}}{P_{t}} \, dj + \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t}} (1 + i_{t-1}) - T_{t} \end{aligned}$$

• Existence of balanced growth path:

$$eta < (\mathit{aq})^{\phi\sigma}$$
 and $(1-\delta) \, (\mathit{g}/\mathit{q})^{ heta-1} < 1$

- **1** Sticky price model with δ -shocks
- Aggregation & optimality of flex price equilibrium
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- Highlight the differences relative to a model with homogeneous firms
- Will spare you the derivation behind the results...
• Aggregate output Y_t :

$$Y_t = rac{A_t Q_t}{\Delta_t} \left(oldsymbol{\mathcal{K}}_t^{1-rac{1}{\phi}} oldsymbol{L}_t^{rac{1}{\phi}} - oldsymbol{\mathcal{F}}_t
ight)$$
 ,

with K_t , L_t aggregate capital, labor and $F_t \ge 0$ fixed costs

• Δ_t : captures joint distribution of prices & productivities:

$$\Delta_t = \int_0^1 \left(\frac{Q_t}{G_{jt} Q_{t-s_{jt}}} \right) \left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} dj \tag{1}$$

• Price level: exp.-weighted average of product prices

$$P_t = \left(\int_0^1 (P_{jt})^{1-\theta} \, dj \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}} \\ = \int_0^1 \left(\frac{Y_{jt}}{Y_t} \right) P_{jt} \, dj$$

Price level accounts for product substitution (as statistical agencies do)

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Price level accounts for product substitution (as statistical agencies do)

Inflation:

$$\Pi_t = P_t / P_{t-1}.$$

Evolution of the aggregate price under opt. price setting:

$$P_{t}^{1-\theta} = (\underbrace{\delta}_{\text{new}} + \underbrace{(1-\alpha)(1-\delta)}_{\text{old adj.firms}} \underbrace{\underbrace{(p_{t}^{n})^{\theta-1} - \delta}_{\text{rel. price}}}_{\text{factor}}) \underbrace{P_{t,t}^{\star}}_{\text{opt}} \overset{1-\theta}{\underset{\text{price}}{}} + \underbrace{\alpha(1-\delta)}_{\text{old firms,}} P_{t-1}^{1-\theta}$$

$$(p_t^n)^{\theta-1} = \delta + (1-\delta) \left(p_{t-1}^n \frac{g_t}{q_t} \right)^{\delta-1}.$$

 $g_t \equiv q_t \implies$ no firm level trends and $(p_t^n)^{ heta-1}
ightarrow 1$ and

$$P_t^{1-\theta} = (\delta + (1-\alpha)(1-\delta))(P_{t,t}^{\star})^{1-\theta} + \alpha(1-\delta)(P_{t-1})^{1-\theta}$$

If - in addition - $\delta = 0$:

$$P_t^{1- heta} = (1-lpha)(P_{t,t}^{\star})^{1- heta} + lpha(P_{t-1})^{1- heta}$$

Standard price evolution equation in homogeneous firm models.

Conditions Insuring Efficiency

- Attaining efficiency requires
 - eliminating firm's monopoly power by an output subsidy
 - choosing Δ_t in the production function

$$Y_t = rac{A_t Q_t}{\Delta_t} \left(\kappa_t^{1-rac{1}{\phi}} L_t^{rac{1}{\phi}} - \mathcal{F}_t
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equal to

$$\Delta_t = \Delta_t^{e} = \left(\int_0^1 \left(\frac{Q_t}{G_{jt} Q_{t-s_{jt}}} \right)^{1-\theta} d\mathbf{j} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta}}$$

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• $\Delta_t = \Delta_t^e$ decentralized by prices satisfying

$$\frac{P_{jt}}{P_t} = \frac{1}{\Delta_t^e} \frac{Q_t}{G_{jt} Q_{t-s_{jt}}}$$

Proposition: With flexible prices ($\alpha = 0$) & appropriate output subsidy, the equilibrium allocation is efficient.

The optimal inflation rate is indeterminate....

- **(**) Sticky price model with δ -shocks
- Ø Aggregation & optimality of flex price equilibrium
- **Optimal inflation: main result**
- Multi-sector extension & empirical strategy

Empirically relevant case E[g_t] > E[q_t] ⇔ new firms small/new products expensive

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we tend to get that $(p_t^n)^{\theta-1} > 1$.

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Price level equation

$$P_t^{1-\theta} = (\delta + (1-\alpha)(1-\delta)\frac{(P_t^n)^{\theta-1} - \delta}{1-\delta})(P_{t,t}^{\star})^{1-\theta} + \alpha(1-\delta)(P_{t-1})^{1-\theta},$$

- \implies old firms choose higher $(P_{tj})^{1-\theta}$ than new firms
- \implies since $1 \theta < 0$: old firms to set lower prices than new firms

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- Efficiency: old firms that adjust must choose same price as old firms that do not adjust
- Need to allow for inflation to achieve efficiency!

Adam & Weber

• **Proposition:** Suppose (1) there is an appropriate output subsidy and (2) initial prices in t = -1 reflect firms' relative productivities, i.e., $P_{j,-1} \propto 1/(Q_{-1-s_{j,-1}}G_{j,-1})$ for all $j \in [0,1]$. The eq. allocation is efficient under sticky price if

$$\Pi_t^{\star} = \left(\frac{1 - \delta / \left(\Delta_t^e\right)^{1-\theta}}{1 - \delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} \tag{2}$$

for all $t \geq 0$, where $(\Delta_t^e)^{1-\theta} = \delta + (1-\delta) \left(\Delta_{t-1}^e q_t/g_t\right)^{1-\theta}$.

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- Prop holds for arbitrary initial prod. distributions & arbitrary shock processes (consistent with balanced growth)
- Proof works as follows: under the inflation rate (2)
 - 1. new firms choose relative price as in the flex price economy
 - 2. existing firms do not want to adjust their price.
 - 3. with initial prices 'right' & output subsidy \implies flex price alloc.

$$\Pi_t^{\star} = \left(\frac{1-\delta/\left(\Delta_t^e\right)^{1-\theta}}{1-\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta-1}}$$

• In the absence δ -shocks/firm level trends ($\delta = 0$ and/or $g_t \equiv q_t$) get familiar result:

$$\Pi_t^* \equiv 1$$

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• In the absence δ -shocks/firm level trends ($\delta = 0$ and/or $g_t \equiv q_t$) get familiar result:

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• Price stability optimal, independently of realized productivity shocks.

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(3)
where $\left(\Delta_{t}^{e}\right)^{1-\theta} = \delta + (1 - \delta) \left(\Delta_{t-1}^{e}q_{t}/g_{t}\right)^{1-\theta}$.

• With firm level trends ($\delta > 0$), steady state inflation is

$$\lim \Pi_t^* = \frac{g}{q}$$

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• With firm level trends ($\delta > 0$), steady state inflation is

$$\lim \Pi_t^* = \frac{g}{q}$$

- SS inflation positive when g > q
- SS independent of δ :
 - fewer unproductive firms enter \rightarrow lower inflation
 - existing firms accumulated more experience \rightarrow higher inflation

(3)

$$\Pi_t^{\star} = \left(\frac{1 - \delta / \left(\Delta_t^e\right)^{1-\theta}}{1 - \delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} \tag{4}$$

where $\left(\Delta_t^e\right)^{1-\theta} = \delta + (1-\delta) \left(\Delta_{t-1}^e q_t/g_t\right)^{1-\theta}$.

Linearization:

$$\pi_t^{\star} = (1-\delta)\pi_{t-1}^{\star} + \delta\left(rac{g_t}{q_t} - 1
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• Positive experience shock (g_t) : persistent rise in opt. inflation

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- Positive experience shock (g_t) : persistent rise in opt. inflation
- Positive chohort shock (q_t) : persistent drop in opt inflation
- $\lim_{\delta \to 0} : \pi_t^{\star}$ random walk, but $Var(\pi_t^{\star}) \to 0$.

- Suppose MP implements $\Pi=1$ in an economy where $\Pi^{\star} \neq 1$
- Analytical result: strictly positive welfare costs even in the limit $\delta
 ightarrow 0$
- Numerical illustration highlighting the source of welfare distortions

Assumptions for the analytical result:

- there is an optimal output subsidy and initial prices reflect initial productivities
- ullet there are no aggregate productivity disturbances and $\delta>0$
- fixed costs of production are zero (f = 0)
- disutility of work is given by

$$V(L)=1-\psi L^{
u}$$
, with $u>1,\psi>0$.

- $g\,/\,q>\alpha(1-\delta),$ so that a well-defined steady state with strict price stability exists
- consider the limit $\beta(\gamma^{e})^{1-\sigma} \rightarrow 1$

The Welfare Costs of Strict Price Stability

Proposition: Consider a policy implementing the optimal inflation rate Π_t^* , which satisfies $\lim_{t\to\infty} \Pi_t^* = \Pi^* = g/q$. Let $c(\Pi^*)$ and $L(\Pi^*)$ denote the limit outcomes for $t \to \infty$ for consumption and hours under this policy. Similarly, let c(1) and L(1) denote the limit outcomes under the alternative policy of implementing strict price stability. Then,

$$L(1) = L(\Pi^{\star})$$

and

$$\frac{c(1)}{c(\Pi^{\star})} = \left(\frac{1-\alpha(1-\delta)(g/q)^{\theta-1}}{1-\alpha(1-\delta)}\right)^{\frac{\phi\theta}{\theta-1}} \left(\frac{1-\alpha(1-\delta)(g/q)^{-1}}{1-\alpha(1-\delta)(g/q)^{\theta-1}}\right)^{\phi} \le 1.$$
(5)

For $g \neq q$ the previous inequality is strict and

$$\lim_{\delta \to 0} c(1)/c(\Pi^{\star}) < 1$$

The Welfare Costs of Strict Price Stability



Figure: Relative prices and inflation

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The Welfare Costs of Strict Price Stability



Figure: Aggregate productivity as a function of gross steady state inflation (optimal inflation rate is 1.02)

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September 2017 35 / 46

- **(**) Sticky price model with δ -shocks
- Ø Aggregation & optimality of flex price equilibrium
- Optimal inflation: main result
- Multi-sector extension & empirical strategy

- Goal: quantify inflation rates arising from firm trends
- Take into account of sector-specific productivity trends: manufacturing vs services
- Present a multi-sector extension of our analytical results & model-consistent empirical strategy

• z = 1, ..., Z sectors, Dixit-Stiglitz competition, sector output Y_{zt}

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• Aggregate price level: $P_t = \prod_{z=1}^{Z} \left(\frac{P_{zt}}{\psi_z}\right)^{\psi_z}$

Proposition: Suppose initial prices reflect initial productivity, no economic disturbances, and an optimal output subsidy. Consider the limit $\beta(\gamma^e)^{1-\sigma} \rightarrow 1$ and suppose monetary policy implements $\Pi_t = \Pi$ for all t. The inflation rate Π that maximizes the resulting steady state utility is

$$\Pi^{\star} = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} \omega_z \left(rac{g_z}{q_z} rac{\gamma_z^e}{\gamma^e}
ight)$$
 ,

where

$$rac{\gamma_z^e}{\gamma^e} = rac{\mathbf{a}_z q_z}{\prod_{z=1}^Z (\mathbf{a}_z q_z)^{\psi_z}}$$

is the growth trend of sector z relative to the growth trend of the aggregate economy in the efficient allocation.

The sector weights $\omega_z \ge 0$ sum to one and are given by

$$\tilde{\omega}_{z} = \frac{\psi_{z}\theta\alpha_{z}(1-\delta_{z})(\Pi\gamma^{e}/\gamma_{z}^{e})^{\theta}(q_{z}/g_{z})}{\left[1-\alpha_{z}(1-\delta_{z})(\Pi\gamma^{e}/\gamma_{z}^{e})^{\theta}(q_{z}/g_{z})\right] \left[1-\alpha_{z}(1-\delta_{z})(\Pi\gamma^{e}/\gamma_{z}^{e})^{\theta-1}\right]}.$$

• The optimal steady state inflation rate

$$\Pi^* = \sum_{z=1}^{Z} \psi_z \left(\frac{g_z \gamma_z^e}{q_z \gamma^e} \right) + O(2),$$

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- Since ψ_z and γ_z^e / γ^e can be inferred from sectoral data, one only has to estimate g_z / q_z from firm level data.
- How to estimate sector specific productivity trends g_z/q_z ?
 - firm level productivity: not observed
 - firm level prices: not observed
 - firm level employment: productivity->prices->demand/employment

• Model implies that g_z/q_z can be estimated from firm level employment trends:

$$\ln(L_{jzt}) = d_{zt} + \eta_z \cdot s_{jzt} + \epsilon_{jzt}, \qquad (6)$$

 d_{zt} :sector dummy, s_{jzt} the age of the firm j, and ϵ_{jzt} a stationary residual term, and

$$\eta_z = (\theta - 1) \ln(g_z/q_z).$$

- Estimate the firm level trends:
 - 65 BEA private industries
 - use LBD database for US Census Data: 147 million firm employment observations
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• Report
$$(\theta - 1) \Pi^* = (\theta - 1) \sum_{z=1}^{Z} \omega_z \left(\frac{g_z}{q_z} \frac{\gamma_z^e}{\gamma^e} \right)$$

Optimal US Inflation times $(\theta - 1)$



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Adam & Weber

September 2017 44 / 46

Table 1: Optimal Inflation Rate (Net)

	Baseline	TV Weights	LQ Specification	Baseline	TV Weights	LQ Specifica
	$\theta = 3.8$			$\theta = 5$		
Π^{\star}_{1986}	2.34%	2.24%	2.70%	1.64%	1.57%	1.89%
Π^{\star}_{2013}	1.02%	1.02%	1.45%	0.71%	0.71%	1.01%

Notes: "Baseline" refers to the baseline estimate of Φ_t with fixed GDP weights and age as single regressor. "TV Weights" refers to the estimate of Φ_t that is based on time-varying GDP weights. "LQ Specification" refers to the estimate of Φ_t that is based on a specification with both age and age squared as regressors. The parameter θ denotes the product demand elasticity. • Aggregate in closed form a sticky price model with firm level productivity trends

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- Productivity disturbances have persistent effects on optimal inflation
- Optimal US inflation: dropped from approx 2% in 1986 to 1% in 2013